Answering the Ordnance Question (with sound effects)

Iranian ballistic missiles go FSWWWWSH from a given battery or launcher, then BIG BOOM between 500-2,500 km away. They carry a much larger payload than rockets and follow a mostly fixed arc. But unlike rockets, ballistic missiles are usually guided, except when they aren’t.

Iranian hypersonic glide missiles or glide bombs go FSWWWWSH from a given batter or launcher, then BIG BOOM between 500-2,500 km away. They carry a similar payload to ballistic missiles but are much faster, achieving up to MACH15, and can go wavy-wavy on the path. They are almost always guided. Except when they aren’t.

Iranian drones go bzzzzz from that empty lot down the street, then boom between 900 -2,500 km away. They are always guided. Except when they aren’t.

Ground based interceptors, such as the THAAD or Patriot which go fswwwssh from a given battery or launcher, then pop the incoming barrage element up to 70-120 km away.

Ground or maritime based 5inch guns which go pop-pop-pop from a given battery, then pop again when they hit the incoming barrage element up to 13km away.

Ground or maritime based proximity chain guns, such as the Phalax CWS which go buuuuuuuuurrp from a given battery, then ‘pop’ when they hit the incomming barrage element up to 1.5km away.

Maritime based anti-missile missiles, which go FSWWSSSSH from a given boat, then ‘pop’ when they hit the incoming barrage element at a few hundred km away.

Ground or maritime laser based interceptors which go pew-pew-pew from a given battery and can melt the face off a rocket or drone at several hundred km, but are hypothetical at this point. But I definitely wasn’t going to pass up the opportunity to say ‘pew-pew.’

Finally there are aircraft based anti-missile missiles, which go fsswwwsh from a plane accompanied by the Danger Zone soundtrack, then ‘pop’ when they hit the incoming barrage element at a few hundred km away.

The longest distance of interest is from ~Tehran to Israel is 1,300-1,500km, in range of most Iranian ballistic missiles and drones, while from the coast of Iran to Israel , rockets and drones.

The distance from the Iranian coastline to Israel is only 900-1,000km; within the outer range of some rockets.

The distance from Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon to Israel is ~10km.

The width of Israel from coastline along the Mediterranean to borders on the east varies from as wide as 115km to as narrow as 10-15km, meaning most of the country .

The distance between Hegseth mouth and his next shot glass on the table is ~10-25cm.

The distance across the Gulf, from the coast of Iran into GCC countries is 35km at it’s narrowest in the Straights of Hormuz and up to 310km at its widest.

Really important to this discussion is everytime the word launcher, battery, aircraft or boat appears above you have to remember borrowing from Ryan McBeth, “between the archer and the arrow.” The ballistic missiles, rockets, drones, interceptors, bullets and anti-missile missiles are all the arrows. The launchers, batteries, aircraft, and boats are the archers.

If you take out an archer, you may take out not just the arrows that are nearby it at the time, but also the ability to fire future arrows in the future. The exception are drones which go bzzzzzzzzzz from that lot down the street, which is really why drones are upending the air domain concept. Likewise, if you take out all the Iranian archers, it won’t matter how many arrows they have left, only their drones.

If you tried to picture every interacting sensor that aims things that shoot or get shot, every battery, launcher, boat, plane, or lot next door that can shoot things, and all the things in the air shooting, being shot at, or delivering a shot…you’d get the powerpoint slide I attached above.

This is the ‘concept’ of Joint All Domain Operations (JADO). Although it covers more than barrage and anti-barrage capabilities, for purposes of this discussion think of it as all the moving parts in the ordnance question, depicting both the archers and the arrows and the things which keep track of them all and why I think reports on things like stockpiles and quantities can be misleading.

For example, Iran has many more ballistic missiles arrows (BIG BOOM) than it does archers. I’ve seen some reports that there were as few as 150-200 mobile launchers at the start of the war. And if you have a ballistic missile which can only be launched from a mobile launcher, you can’t fire it really after you lose all of them, no matter how many missiles you have of that type left.

Also not all arrows are aimed equally. A lot of them are going to miss their target. This is where I’ve highlighted and zoomed in on a phenomena and causal link in the feedback structure of “capability to detect misses.” Math is amazing and except for highly guided ordnance, you can tell where it’s going to hit within seconds of its launch. And if you plot that arc and it lands in an abandoned field or the side of a hill, or splashes in the gulf, you can let that one go. You don’t need to direct counter-barrage activity towards it.

Finally not all arrows hit equally. The difference between boom and BIG BOOM is nontrivial. And if push comes to shove, you may decide to ‘accept’ a boom if it means avoiding a BIG BOOM. The things that do the biggest booms, Iranian ballistic missiles, are also the ones most constrained by launcher availability.

One reason I laid out the phasing is to help with this large game of numbers as Iranian barrages and activated proxies spread out the anti-barrage capabilities of the US and Israeli coalition.

I suspect most reports people are reading are based on *ground-based* interceptors only. The inventories for the THAAD and Patriots, which to be fair, are extremely expensive and hard to resupply.

But ground based interceptors are just one part of the JADO picture. There’s also the aircraft of which there are now several hundred. Although not the optimal choice for bang to buck ratio, they are extremely versatile and you can set them to hunting launchers or proxies (archers) or intercepting that which gets launched (arrow). Yah it’s pricey. But their ability to rapidly move and deploy can flex your assets through the system. And it’s not just the aircraft on the USCG Lincoln, Ford, or based at Qatar now. The GCC airforces are stepping in. The Jordanian airforce is probably playing a role. All of these are probably doing zone-defense, sticking close to home, but they can augment “their patch” meaning the US aircraft assigned to fill holes can focus on the gaps.

Likewise each carrier group on station, both the Lincoln and the Ford, have in their fleet multiple anti-missile cruisers. These ships carry a mixture of anti-missile missiles, 5inch guns, and proximity guns. Put a few of these off the coast of Israel and they can cover most of Israel in a defensive shield. Put a few in the Gulf and they can intercept the barrages as they come over the water towards the GCC. Even the Phalanx CWS, as I saw first hand in Afghanistan, can take out a rocket or a drone as it gets within the proximity sensors. And yes, that debris is going to fall somewhere, but that’s a far cheaper solution than an expensive ship or aircraft anti-missile missile or ground based interceptor.

Coordinating all these are sensors on every boat, battery, aircraft, and ground based radar station. I’ve mentioned this as the perfect case test of the F-35’s “networked battle” capability. Why it ‘sits back’ and basically tracks dozens if not hundreds of individual entities helping direct the battlespace like miniature and stealthed AWACS.

That doesn’t make JADO less dangerous. We learned today a Kuwaiti F-18 was the source of shooting down three F-15’s on Sunday night. Probably mistaking them (at range) for barrage elements or perhaps if close for MIG-25’s which they look like.

But every time new assets join the fight, they are bringing anti-barrage capabilities and anti-barrage stockpiles of their own. The French aircraft that flew in yesterday, and the French carrier strike group steaming towards the Mediterranean now. And though Patriot and THAAD ground based interceptors are hard to resupply, we can resupply some. We can also fly in resupply of the other forms of interceptors.

Now the math on all this …gets…complicated.

How many launchers or batteries can we take out, how many archers can we remove before they get a chance to shoot all their arrows? How good are we at assigning the right counter-barrage response to the barrage element, saving expensive kit for BIG BOOM ballistic missiles and either using the cheaper kit or absorbing the hit of the drones. How accurate is Iranian firing solutions? How many times do they miss and can we just let those through? Which areas are more important to protect? The Straight of Hormuz for global economic reasons of the oil trade, GCC capitals to protect our allies, or our own naval vessels if an Iranian rocket, missile, and drone barrage aims itself at a carrier.

So I’m going on a mental model here. But I suspect, all factors considered, we’ll probably outlast the Iranians in the ordnance equation because it’s not just ground-based interceptors we have, but the entirey of JADO.

WE HAVE THE ENTIRE POWERPOINT!!

*Me. I’ve created some of these spaghetti map slides!