12 Mar 2026
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12 MAR Forecast Update on Iran War & Minimum Duration Forecast

Posted in Foreign Affairs, InfoMullets, Iran War of 2026 By Timothy Clancy On March 12, 2026
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TLDRUpFront: Barring an unexpected capitulation, the most likely scenario now seems to be the war continuing for another 31 days, at *least* of Iran launching continued intermittent barrages and strikes around the region, with escalating air operations by the US against Iran and Israel against Lebanon and less against Iran. Look for the Houthis to enter the war during that time either attacking or being provoked to attack US or Israel forces and adding Yemen to the battlespace.
FULL CONTEXT IN THE BACK:(see PHASE Descriptions & Forecast Scenarios 1-5 at bottom)
12 MAR Update: We’ve well eclipsed any possibility of scenario 1 or 2, which are the hoped US & Israel or Iranian outcomes. We are now straddling Phase V and Phase VI of scenario 3, which is likely where we’ll be for weeks, at least until 12 APR for reasons I’ll explain below, with some possibility of a rapid change after 12 APR to Scenario 4 or 5.
Why do I think the war will go on *at least* 31 more days, to 12 APR?
First – the Shia mourning period of 40 days, which allowed us to set our clocks from the massacres which ended the January uprisings 8-9 JAN to the return of protests FEB 17-20 also applies to the killing of Grand Ayatollah and Supreme Leader Khamenei. Forty days from his assassination is 9 APR. Iran and its proxies are going to have to take military action on or around that day. Even if, in the unlikely scenario its forces are exhausted and facing collapse, and the strikes are largely symbolic, they have to do something. And that’s going to provoke another three days of wind-down fighting hence the 12 APR estimate.

12 APR is also ~31 days from today, and that’s about 10 days past the expected 20days it will take the IEA’s 400m/bbl release to be consumed (assuming ~20M/bbl/day normal Strait of Hormuz transit). That doens’t mean oil prices will stay below $100/bbl before then, I expect them to remain at or above that $100/bbl threshold throughout this time. But the IEA released 1/3rd of its reserves, and barring another release, and continuing conditions, you’d see a huge step UP of oil prices as the beneficial effects of the release exhaust.

Finally that’s about the time when families begin making serious plans for summer travel and if gas prices remain elevated (anything north of $80/bbl) the pain is really going to start being felt economically.

Unfortunately, that’s an optimistic estimate, as a realistic estimate is that if both sides dig in, this war could go on for much longer. (This is one of those times I’d love my forecast to be really wrong and this whole thing settles tomorrow.)

This is because we’re now in that “weeks” period straddling Phase V and Phase VI of the actual forecast (scenario 3). Iran has hunkered down in it’s “mosaic warfare” operations (expect to see that word coming up a lot lately) it’s planning for decades. This is where disaggregated and decentralized forces operate on preplanned instructions to continue retaliatory strikes around the region. People are mistakenly judging total volumes of barrages, which have declined, with the *effect* of even intermittent barrages. This is most evident in the attacks against tankers and oil infrastructure. Iran doesn’t have to hit dozens of tankers a day – just 1-3 every few days and an oil field now and then to keep oil prices moving higher, even against the backdrop of the historic IEA release of emergency oil reserves. Likewise they don’t have to send the same number of rockets, missiles, and drones against the GCC or Israel as they did in the opening salvos. They just have to send enough to keep those populations in a state of semi-permanent alert to grind their functioning economies to a halt.

Likewise the US and Israel don’t have to run around countering the volume of barrages, and indeed I’ve seen more indications they are now attacking the irregular Basiji and regular IRGC units you’d need to target to reduce the regime capability to protect itself. The problem for US and Israel is that you still need to cover a huge battlespace. I don’t think people really realize how big, or active this theater of operations is. If you put it over the United States it’d probably cover most of the US and parts of Canada and Mexico. The location of the tanker getting hit in the Straits of Hormuz is about 600+ miles from Basra where two other tankers were hit last night and those are both 700 – 1300 miles from Tel Aviv.

And the focus for Israel seems to have shifted off Iran (though they are still conducting some operations) and north into Lebanon where they conducting both ground and air operations against Hezbollah forces. That’s before we consider Yemen and Somaliland. The Houthis in Yemen have stayed out of the fight so far, but I imagine they’re going to either choose to enter when its clear the Iranian regime won’t collapse (and the US CSG Ford has been a tempting target exiting the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb and leaving the Red Sea). Even if a Houthi-US fight doesn’t break out, Israel is setting up expeditionary basing in Somaliland which broke away from Somali and was recognized by Israel in December of 2025. That puts it just across the Red Sea from Houthi bases in Yemen. And with the United States doing the bulk of the heavy lifting against Iran, Israel is free to continue to try to dismantle Iranian proxies in Hezbollah and the Houthis, so I wouldn’t be surprised if ‘something’ starts a conflict there.

And the US has its hands full. There have been dozens of attacks on US bases by Shia-backed and Iranian-friendly Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq. Although these have all been fended off, it speaks to the activity. Certainly, never in Iraq or Afghanistan that I can recall did you see so many bases simultaneously attacked. Sure, one or two bases would take an attack of some magnitude (I’m not talking ye weekly mortar or 105mm rocket off the ice stand trick either.) But not so many at once.

And Iran doesn’t need to land everything it aims. The imagery of two tankers on fire, one of which I believe was American flagged, off the coast of Basra Iraq, and an oil refinery hit in the GCC, is enough to pretty much cut the oil-price savings.

And that’s probably, unfortuantely but hopefully not shocking anyone, a good “all-in” measure of how things are going. You can read ISW daily briefs and try to parse agile combat employment vs. mosaic warfare doctrines, read infographics of sorties and munitions and interception vs. land rates…or…you could just hit up CNBC dot com and check the price of oil.

If oil is elevated, above $75/bbl, then Iran is doing what it needs to to keep the pressure on its opponents. If it’s up over $120/bbl, it’s doing very well.

One good, or bad, update, depending on perspective, is it seems the threat of ethnic insurgencies from Kurdish forces in the northwest has waned. There was a lot of very realistic concerns that a significant Kurdish attack, perhasp even a thunder-run on the capital, could split the country into factional civil war. (I have these concerns myself.) However on closer examination, it does not appear the Iranian-Kurdish foces are anywhere near that level of capability.

Most of the “Kurdish forces” being reported as ready to ‘invade’ are actually a few hundred Iranian Kurds in exile living up near Mosul in Iraq. The much stronger Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerge have zero appetite for going into Iran, and the Iraq government itself has huge interests in keeping those exiles from crossing over and causing trouble. There has been some sectarian violence in the north between Kurds and the Shia-aligned PMF’s I mentioned. But no major outbreaks. If President Trump seriously wanted to arm and train the Kurds to take it to Iran, it would realistically take years for a decent force to be manned, equipped, and trained. And there lingers deep suspicion of the last time Trump abandoned the Kurds in northern Syria after the fall of ISIS in October 2019. UPDATE1: It appears an Iraqi PMF has attacked a base in Kurdish held Irbil wounding six French soldiers (see first comment for sources.)

So I don’t see much in the way of ethnic insurgenices turning into civil war.

But I also dont’ see much in the way of regime collapse yet either. Yes we’re hitting lots of targets, and with air superiority, if not supremacy, established, we’re starting to hit more bread and butter ground campaign targets. But Iran is a very big place, and even reaching the eastern provinces bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan is a haul for sustained operations. So there’s parts we’re not hitting as much (which I think the daily brief maps show). I’ve also noticed we’re hitting again targets that were ‘destroyed’ in the 12-Day War. Maybe that’s becuase they’ve been reconstituted. But a lot of brags by Netanyahu and Trump in the past year of this or that building or facility or capability being destroyed and rendered inoperable for “ten years” are being revisited by fresh attacks.

Certainly assassinating Supreme Leader Khamenei didn’t provide much utility as he was replaced by, wait for it, Supreme Leader Khamenei II.

This is why I think the war goes on at least a month from here, and likely more. The Iranians had an offramp window with the Supreme Leader election and reduction in barrage frequency to signal a desire to end. But by picking Khamenei Jr, and then hitting tankers in the Gulf, Straits, and oil refineries in the GCC; they are clearly settling in for the long hall.

And don’t even get me started on my frustration with performative masculinity by this MAGA administration. We have one Secretary say that tankers are being escorted by the Navy through the Straits of Hormuz, then that gets walked back. Then the President announces a plan to provide insurance and escort – yet the tanker hit crossing was unescorted. We’re just now (today) getting the insurance setup. Then there’s the multiple times the Iranian navy has been ‘destroyed’ – only to have explosive laden boats ram tankers in Basra and CENTCOM announce the destruction of a dozen or so minelayers, which last I checked, are naval vessels.

What’s frustrating is none of this should have been a surprise. I remember Iran mining the Gulf when I was a child and the plans to escort ships through back then. I suspect the size of the battlespace and the range of areas that have to be protected, when including GCC allies, is spreading resources thin. Which again plays to Iran being able to sustain itself in this fight for a month or longer. UPDATE2: Two US military aircraft collided over Iraqi airspace leading to the loss of one K-135 tanker. The other aicraft landed safely. CENTCOM reports rescue efforts are underway for the downed aircraft. (See first comment thread for source.)

Anyways, that’s the update. Sources in first comment when I get to them (which may be tonight). Spelling and grammar fixes sometime after that.

PHASES OF US-IRAN WAR
Phase I: Blue Airpower Conducts SEAD in Red Territory
Phase II-A: Blue Interdiction and Close Air Support to Uprisings & Separatist Movements
Phase II-B: Blue Airpower Decapitation Strikes on Red C2
Phase III: Red Counters with Regional Barrages
Phase IV: Blue Reallocates Airpower to Interception & Launcher Hunting
Phase V: Red Counters by Activating Regional Proxies
Phase VI: Blue Reallocates Airpower to Proxy Hunting
Phase VII: After Red’s Barrage and Proxy Capabilities are Exhausted Blue Close Air Support to Uprisings & Separatist Movements Until Emerging State Actor Conflict Dynamics Take Over

TLDR SUMMARY OF SCENARIOS IN FORECAST

Ordered least likely to most likely.
1) A complete collapse of the regime under Phase VII attacks or even earlier decapitation strikes or calls for ‘surrender’ of the IRGC. Very unlikely.
2) Iran counter-punches exceed regional and US/Israeli domestic appetite for another forever war and pressure on the Blue Forces (US and Israel) to disengage with the Iranian regime intact. Don’t think it’s probable.
3) The US and Israel coalition exhausts Iranian counter-punches and succeed in sparking popular uprisings and ethnic insurgencies. These result in emerging-state actor dynamics that topple, or at least tangle, the Iranian regime, significantly reducing its power and projection capability for years to come. Probable, if grim, scenario.
4) The US and Israel coalition exhausts Iranian counter-punches but fail to spark popular uprisings or ethnic insurgencies after several months. This is a likely scenario.

5) The sides break off combat operations suddenly under auspices of a ceasefire and negotiation. This is the most likely scenario, but only after the end of this week.

SOURCES

First off are daily briefs by ISW that provide the right balance between depth and summary, though they come out in the evening and so are time delayed.
https://understandingwar.org/analysis/middle-east/A very deep dive into “mosaic warfare” and Iran’s capabilities of it, published by RAND in 2022. So it’s not that the depth, strength, and preparedness of Iran to resist regime attacks wasn’t known well in advance, see pages 19-21 for overview of Iranian capabilities. But it reads pretty spot on to what’s happening now (emphasis added):
“Against hostile conventional forces, Iran emphasises ‘passive and mosaic defence doctrines to provide cost-imposing deterrence strategies in addition to more creative physical defences’.90
***The concept of ‘Mosaic Warfare’ recognises the effectiveness of US network-centric warfare and the importance of maintaining a capable Iranian resistance even when key nodes in Iran’s overarching C2 system have been neutralised through kinetic and non-kinetic attack. Through mosaic warfare Tehran aims to promote flexibility and creativity, empowering local commanders to utilise multi-domain capabilities (and
unconventional forces) to mount a layered defence and prepare their area of responsibility for sustained insurgency within Iran’s borders, even in the absence of instructions.***
This approach seeks to develop overall resilience within the integrated Iranian defence ‘system’, as opposed to relying on the survivability of key nodes or linkages within that system in the face of a possible sustained assault by a US-led coalition employing sophisticated precision strike capabilities as well as cyber and EW. In many respects, this represents a defensively oriented mirror to Russian and Chinese ‘systems
thinking’ (see Section 3.1 and 3.2).
***Iran’s doctrine of ‘Retaliatory Deterrence’ includes asymmetric warfare in combination with missile forces, and increasingly involves the use of cyber. Iran’s deterrence strategy is centred on the principle of ‘Retaliatory Deterrence’ or ‘Threat in Response to Threat’; namely, the principle of responding to an attack
through retaliatory actions that inflict pain on the adversary, to dissuade them from aggression or to deescalate quickly.91 Iranian military leaders often refer to this doctrine as Threat in Response to Threat. Iran is shifting towards a multi-pronged approach to retaliatory deterrence that exploits the opportunities offered by new domains and technologies. In addition to the enduring threat of terrorism and insurgency posed by the IRGC’s Quds Force and regional proxies, Iran continues to develop long-range ballistic and cruise missile systems92 to compensate for a lack of long-range airpower,93 while also increasingly investing in forces and capabilities for cyber and information warfare.94***”
https://www.rand.org/…/RRA500/RRA528-1/RAND_RRA528-1.pdf

Assessment that the Iranian regime is not nearing collapse:
https://thehill.com/policy/international/5782102-iran-regime-collapse-unlikelyUPDATE2: Report of midair collision by two US military aircraft leading to loss of a crucial K-135 tanker and ongoing rescue efforts.
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5781924-us-military-kc-135-crash/

UPDATE of Erbil attack wounding French soldiers in northern Iraq.
https://www.reuters.com/world/six-french-soldiers-wounded-iraq-after-drone-attack-army-says-2026-03-12
Deeper dive by LJW inthe fighting in Northern Iraq.
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/03/us-condemns-iranian-and-militia-attacks-in-iraq-amid-unclaimed-airstrikes-on-tehran-backed-militias.php

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