TLDRUpFront: A forecast update and comparison of the reference behavior modes of most likely scenarios at start of war compared to actual data of barrage and proxy attacks.
FULLContextIntheBack:
Forecasted dynamic hypotheses are by their very nature, abstracted. You’re trying to estimate based on the CLD a variety of scenarios, all of which will be counterfactual except for the one that actually happens. But you hope the scenario that does happen is within your forecast set. And it doesn’t get much closer than this. Here’s a comparison of the ‘actual’ dynamic hypothesis mode created 36hours after the war started with the actual data 17 days in. For clarty I’ve split the original dynamic hypothesis to highlight only Red Barrage Attacks (e.g. rockets, missiles, and drones) as well as Red Proxy Attacks (e.g. attacks by Hezbollah, Iraqi PMF or Houthis).
I think this shows how Iran’s mosaic warfare approach can sustain cost-imposing measures in terms of civilian and infrastructure damage directly on US allies as well as costs globally by keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed. And they don’t need to send thousands of drones a day to do it. They can send a dozen or three every few days. This rate is not going to ‘collapse’ the system of any gulf state or regional ally of the US. But it will impose costs.
But it also shows how the US and Israel can likewise sustain their optempo in the face of this. Iran isn’t targeting them in significant and substantive ways in their retaliatory measures that are going to shift the balance. What results is the ‘grinding’ scenario I mentioned in the first forecast which may, after weeks or months, resolve into the exhaustion of Iranian barrage capabilities and the shift of Blue forces to targeting regime security capabilities in Basiji or IRGC. But it’s also just as likely to result in the other “actual” scenario, which is reaching a certain point where both sides have ‘saved enough face’ after a few weeks of this and rapidly move to ceasefire negotiations, recognizing the continued mutual cost is unacceptable.
Sources
Original FB Post on 16 MAR 2026.
ISW 15 MAR Update:
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-15-2026
