Goodfellas Scenario Forecast
TLDRUpFront: Beginning tomorrow through April 9th, there is a likely window Houthis will enter the war by closing the Strait of Bab el Mandeb and commencing barrage attacks. This sets up a very unlikely, but not impossible, contingency for a Goodfellas scenario where, even if the US signals ceasefire and withdrawal, the Axis of Resistance continues holding both Straits and won’t let the US leave the war it started.
Yes – I know this is a scene from A Bronx Tale, but in my defense had written this entire analysis, annotated the meme, and posted it before someone let me know I goofed. So I’m owning this and keeping it as the “GoodFellas Scenario.”
FULL CONTEXT IN THE BACK:
There’s been a lot going on since the last update. All of it signals to the conflict continuing, and even widening, through my previous forecast of April 9-12 being the earliest this ends. Given short attention spans I’ll briefly outline the Goodfellas scenario first, then go through the noteworthy updates of why I think this scenario is possible, even if not likely. That will be followed by a more detailed analysis of the Goodfellas scenario, as well as counterfactuals of why it may not happen.
GOODFELLAS SCENARIO BRIEF
The Goodfellas scenario chains three scenarios: a likely scenario (55-80%) followed by a roughly even chance scenario (45-55%) followed by another roughly even chance scenario (45-55%) as a sequential variation. Calculating throughput probability results in only an 11-24% probability or midpoint of very unlikely to low end of unlikely.
The first, likely, scenario is where the Houthis enter the conflict between now and April 12th for reasons described below. They shut down the Strait of Bab ed Mandeb at the southern end of the Rea Sea and commence barrage attacks. This severs the east-west maritime lanes and creates a catastrophic gap-up in energy prices and disruption of trade just as just as IEA reserve releases exhaust. Then there are roughly even chances at that point President Trump capitulates to pressure to end the war under some face-saving reason of declaring victory and tries to withdraw US forces and negotiate a cease fire. This parallels my previous scenario #5 where both sides, realizing they can’t win, find face saving measures to exit and move to ceasefire.
The Goodfellas scenario is a roughly-even-odds chance that even as Trump signals willingness to leave and negotiate Khamenei (Iran) and Abdul-Malik (Houthi) lock the door, put the key in their pocket and say “now youse can’t leave” forcing the US to dislodge them or offer extreme concessions.
KEY UPDATES TO FORECAST
Combining a selection of key updates
1. Iran Retains Capable-Enough C2 Across the Regional Theater
Despite many decapitation strikes over the past three weeks it’s very likely Iran has a capable-enough command and control (C2) across its operational theater. There’s just too much evidence of sophisticated adaptation to novel events. For example when Israel struck the Asaluyeh refineries on the Pars gas fields, Iran retaliated almost immediately against energy infrastructure targets. The pace of those attacks then lowered, without going to zero. Likewise yesterday, after the strike on Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz, Iran retaliated targeting an Israel nuclear facility near Dimona. That looks more like a dial someone is turning than a series of IFTHEN opords written out in advance. Iran is also showing sophistication in its proposed Strait of Hormuz vetting system. Likewise, when President Trump or Prime Minister Netanyahu make escalatory threats on Friday and Saturday (see below), Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf responded almost immediately with a credible escalation threat of their own.
This is the most important update because it takes capable-enough C2 to coordinate and exploit all the remaining aspects.
2. Oil is preparing to “gap up” in a step-shock in the next few weeks.
The second most important update is to return to the oil prices I mentioned previously were a good overall barometer of all things security wrapped into a chart. If you don’t have time to be an OSINT bro or RUMINT sister: pouring over tweets, trying to verify sources, mentally calculating the dead and wounded and infrastructure damage and which government you can believe is telling the truth – you can just look at three oil prices.
I’ve attached an annotated chart comparing Brent, WTI, and Dubai Spot prices. In order that’s the price index for futures of Gulf oils (Brent), domestic US production or West Texas Intermediate (WTI), and the spot price of actual physical purchases in Dubai. Normally all three correlate closely to on another but the three have diverged since the start of the war. Brent and WTI have diverged due to the shut down of the Strait of Hormuz, as WTI is still shipping. However, and this is important, US gasoline prices correlate with Brent and not WTI. This has to do with complications of oil crude weights and blends and economics of fungible commodities. But when looking where US gas prices go, look to Brent and not WTI. Second a huge disconnect between the futures Brent and spot-price of Dubai has opened up of ~$20/bbl. The Dubai spot price is what is actually being paid for physical receipt of oil in the Gulf, and probably better reflects actual security conditions. The gap is probably on account of belief the US will open the Straits and the effect of the IEA release of emergency reserves in the first week. But that IEA release is about to burn out, and there’s no sign of the Strait of Hormuz opening. Keep an eye on this chart. If over the next few weeks the Dubai spot decreases to Brent, and Brent decreases towards WTI that’s a good sign of actual perceived security. However, if the gap remains, there’s a high risk that at some point Brent will “gap-up”, where the futures prices closes to meet the spot price and the price of oil goes up $20-$30/bbl. This is does not account for the Houthis entering the war. If they do, and close the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb expect spot prices, and Brent, to jump up another $15-$20 creating a catastrophic shock to the energy system. The kind of pressure the Houthis may enjoy maintaining in the Goodfellas scenario below.
3. USCG Ford Relocates to Crete
The third biggest update is what gives the Houthi some breathing room to maneuver. Previously the USCG Ford, the largest and most powerful battlegroup on the planet, was stationed in the Red Sea, ready to hammer the Houthis if they moved. However, the USCG Ford is on its way to port in Crete to repair internal damage suffered during a laundry fire. It may be ironic that the largest and most powerful battlegroup on the planet wasn’t taken out of action due to enemy fire, but what sounds at first like someone didn’t clean the lint trap. But keep in mind laundry machines on aircraft carrier are more industrial sized Lavandería Brillante than a Best Buy vertical stack. So a “fire’ can be a no-joke serious amount of internal damage and operational impact. You can’t tell sailors covered in jet fumes and oils to just “tough it out and wear ‘em another day” and some reports had hundreds of sailors sleeping in halls due to inability to access their normal sleeping areas. While grunts may say “hah hah tough it out” it has to be kept in mind that Ford is now well into the longest naval deployment since Vietnam, at over 11 months, and has been running non-stop operations for weeks during the war. They have been toughing it out. But there’s a limit, and that limit has been reached. While out of position for however long repairs takes (days or weeks), Israel will have reduced sea-based interceptor support along its coastline. Israel, Jordan and the Red Sea will have reduced defense and offensive counterair operations coming from the Ford to the extent those aircraft aren’t repositioned at regional airfields. Creating the tradeoff of maintaining optempo while increasing risk of getting hit by barrages. This creates a window in which the Houthis have more room to maneuver and act without the Ford standing on top of their head.
5. Iraq is now in an Insurgency and Approaching Civil War, Israeli is fully engaged in Lebanon
Though its not getting much attention what’s going on in Iraq is like a sub-theater within a theater. And it’s getting messy, touching along the deep ethnic and sectarian fault lines that have thrown Iraq into civil war in the past. Iraqi PMF have been regularly attacking US installations across the country since the start of the war with drones and rockets. But they’ve also been attacking, along with Iranian drones, Iranian Kurds in exile in the semi-autonomous Kurdish north of Iraq. That led to ‘unclaimed’ retaliation of what some suspect is the Kurdish Peshmerga against PMF positions and bases.
In Baghdad it came to such a bloody mess that PMF was swarming the US Embassy and Camp Victory with rockets and drones launched from within the city that those installations were reduced to C-RAM proximity defenses. But the US military retaliated quickly with return strikes against Iraqi PMF. This led to an odd-localized quasi-ceasefire where apparently through interlocutors the US and Iraqi PMF have agreed not to attack each other embassy, though the rest of the country remains fair game. Even Iraqi governmental infrastructure in Baghdad, including the intelligence ministry, have been attacked by Iraqi PMF. Basically in the context of the wider war – I wouldn’t say any base is in danger of getting overrun, but no base is safe from constant barrage threats. And there is a growing chance that a quick spiral of escalation along Sunni, Shia, Kurdish faction fault lines or the emerging Iraqi government Shia and Iraqi PMF Shia could lead to civil war. And oh yeah, ISIS containment is collapsing in Syria after up to 24,000 escaped detention camps back in January. Though mostly women and children, one should never underestimate women fighting for ISIS and the foreign fighters who released them, and have facilitated their dispersal are basically operating unchecked in eastern Syria under conditions which led to the rapid rise of ISIS in the first case 2013-2014.
And Israeli remains entangled in southern Lebanon. Apparently the 80’s called and they want their permanent occupation of southern Lebanon back. It’s also becoming clear that Israel has effectively quasi-annexed the Druze of Syria and will come to their defense.
All this means for the scenario is the additive complexity of ground operations and risks are focused to the north of the operational theaters. This means the Houthi’s opening a flank in the south create much more additive complexity than an additional Iraqi PMF joining the fight in Iraq or another Israel ground operation in Lebanon or Hezbollah attempt to counter.
6. All Sides Signal Climbing the Escalation Ladder – and Houthis are Chiming In
The last operational- consideration is on the escalation ladder I discussed a few days ago. The last 48-72 hours has seen significant threats of escalation, and for the first time the Houthis are chiming in with operational red lines which, if crossed will cause them to enter the conflict. But those red lines are already being crossed so this may just be a pretext to justify their late intervention taking advantage of the Ford-window.
Some of the signals (and some of these I’m reading as they happen this morning)
- On Thursday and Friday – the Houthis began getting specific. Up to now they’ve mainly been posting “I Stand with Khamenei” memes and changing their FB profile pics to Iranian flags. On Thursday the commander of the movement, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi , indicated all military options remains open and this was clarified on Friday by a senior Ansar Allah politician Mohammed al-Bukhaiti warned any Arab country; including “Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, against intercepting the missiles coming from Iran and Yemen and the entire Resistance Axis against the Zionist entity. Any country that intercepts the Axis’s missiles will be treated as an inseparable part of the Zionist entity.” The trick of that is those countries are already intercepting Iranian barrages on the daily targeting their countries, and it’s not always clear which of those barrages were ‘aimed at Israel’ so the Houthis have given themselves a ready made red line that has already been crossed by the time I write this Sunday morning.
- On Friday Prime Minister Netanyahu threatened regime collapse of Iran, the existential threat to which the IRGC will allow no negotiations on. He caveated that it would require ground operations (which Israel can’t provide) but it wasn’t exactly signaling negotiations by sending an FTD Pick Me Up Bouquet.
- On Saturday President Trump issued an ultimatum to reopen the Strait of Hormuz in 48hours or he would begin attacking Iranian power plants. n return Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf signaled that any attack on Iran’s power infrastructure would result in increased attacks on regional energy infrastructure.
- Then ‘somebody’ (Israel says not them) attacked the Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz. Though nuclear leakage occurred it was a clear strike on an Iranian vital interest.
- And within hours of the attack on Natanz, denial or no, Iran retaliated by firing ballistic missiles at a key Israeli nuclear research facility, hitting nearby towns of Arad and Dimona wounding over 160. This is further evidence of Iran being able to thread gaps in the Iron Dome, perhaps exacerbated by the departure of the Ford as it follows ballistic missile strikes landing near direct hits on critical infrastructure and civilian locations. This includes a hit on Ben Gurion airport and strikes in Tel Aviv. All of this will probably trigger Israel’s ‘bloodlust’ doctrine, that if you hit them, they will try to hit you ten times as hard, no matter what it costs them in the long run.
- Finally, wrapping it up 28minutes ago as I write this, the IRGC have countered Trump’s threat, threatening to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed until any power plants damaged under Trump’s threat are completely rebuilt.
7. SA-67/358 Suspected in F-35 Shooting
A tactical consideration is that there some indication that the damage to the F-35 may have been from an Iranian SA-67/358. Designed by Iranians and later supplied to Houthis (who may be able to manufacture their own) the 358 is a low cost loitering munition that uses high fidelity cameras and visual identification versus radar, infrared, or laser guidance. This allows the missile to be visually aimed and fired. Often from something as mobile as a pickup or cargo van. It can also be launched into a patrolling ‘orbit’ where after launch the missile loiters briefly in the air scanning with its cameras to see if it can pick out an aircraft and then aim itself towards it. None of these would spark a current warning, that I know of, to a pilot they were being tracked, let alone that a missile was incoming. Nor would current technical countermeasures such as stealth, chaff, flares etc. be effective against it.
The missile cannot catch up to supersonic aircraft – it was designed for drones and helicopters. However, aircraft do not transit to combat zones at full throttle. If the flight path of even an advanced aircraft like the F-35 is known, its daytime, and its flying low enough a ‘net’ of these mobile launchers can start scanning the skies. And this is where live time Russian intelligence, and its ability to be relayed by a capable-enough Iranian C2 can make a difference. If Russians alert to the launch and flight path of an aircraft, and 358 crews are close enough, they can mobilize to create a net and ‘hope to get lucky’. Obvious countermeasures remain: flying at night, at very high altitudes, at hypersonic speeds, or simply using stand-off munitions that keep the aircraft at a distance. But all of these reduce the optempo of offensive counterair operations of launcher hunting, interdiction, or close air support. And, relevant to this forecast, the Houthis have an unknown number of these but possibly hundreds if not thousands. Contested reports indicate they can even build them. It was the Houthis who first demonstrated these rockets in taking out a Saudi drone and Apache helicopter as well as suspected in the shootdown of a US aircraft in Afghanistan.
GOODFELLAS SCENARIO LONG
So all of the above point to a timing window where, if they wish to maximize impact, the Houthis can enter into the war and close the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. Until they do, there’s only an 11-24% of the Goodfellas scenario occurring. But once they do, that chance goes up 19%-30% chance.
From a military perspective the Goodfellas scenario is a crude version of Napolean’s strategy of the central position. Despite being geographically distance, given the outer ranges of their barrage and drone capabilities, IRGC and Houthis have overlapping fields of fire to combine attacks on any forces seeking to clear the Strait of Hormuz or the Strait of Bab ed Mandeb. That’s the ‘central’ position. And their opponents can no longer transit from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Oman with ease. Fleets trying to reach the Gulf of Oman from the eastern US coast or Mediterranean would have to divert around the Cape of Good Hope. And fleets departing from the Caribbean or west coast would likely transit the Pacific to approach the Gulf of Oman from the east. Of course aircraft could still fly from bases in Israel and the GCC, and carriers could station in the Red Sea and Gulf of Oman. But coordinating those two together would be trickier given both are on the outer ranges with the combined Houthi and Iranian barrage capabilities between them.
To clear this central position would require significant, extended military operations. Under determined overlapping defenses from ‘one side’ you’d have to have to assemble a joint sea-land-air ground force on ‘one of the sides.’ Then proceed with a ground invasion of Hormozgan province (to clear the Strait of Hormuz force) or ground invasion of Yemen (to clear the Strait of Bab ed Mandeb first.)
And don’t get it wrong, the US has enough military power to do this alone, if necessary. But it would take time to muster, coordinate, deploy and plan – result in high US casualties and all that time you’d have the kind of barrage environment we see now plus a disruption of nearly 30% global oil traffic and 9-15% global trade. Not to mention it would strip US forces from nearly everywhere else in the globe. We struggled to conduct two irregular wars during GWOT. And battalions and combat brigades are easier to disperse than a fixed, and limited, number of carrier groups.
During this time Iran and Houthis would enjoy a kind of global power, influence, and attention they’ve never had before. From rogue states to ‘holding states.’ For whatever window those Straits are closed they hold the initiative – perhaps instituting toll-based transit (as Iran is trying to set up now). The Houthis might seek an extreme concession – control of Yemen. Though the Saudi’s would howl I don’t think the rest of the world can find Sanaa on a map, especially when their eyes are blurred by $150+ prices for a barrel of oil. There’s a remote possibility too, very remote but not impossible that a new order emerges where Iran and Houthis continue to hold the Straits, with the rest of the world fuming at Khamenei and Abdul-Malik while they pay them, but equally fuming at Trump and Netanyahu for putting them in this position.
GOODFELLAS COUNTERFACTUALS
Given an 11-24% chance of Goodfellas scenario happening, that leaves a 76-89% chance it doesn’t happen. And what are some of the reasons?
First – the Houthis just don’t enter the conflict. Despite all I’ve said above Iran is punching at the weight class of the war. They are not decisively winning it. Houthis may decide they want none of this smoke and their interests have never been as tightly aligned with Iran as Hezbollah or the Iraqi PMF. Over time, the chances of Iran being able to keep pace with Israeli and US strikes is less and less. Despite all of the above, both countries are able to hit Iranian defense production facilities inside the country and the overall pace of Iranian attacks (see chart from yesterday) continue to decline against most countries. Hezbollah is picking up some of the slack by continuing to increase attacks on Israel, but that doesn’t help Iran, only hurt and entangle Israel and maybe draw some Israeli jets to defensive counterair and close air support over the Lebanon front vs. offensive counterair and interdiction strikes in Iran .
I’ve even heard some reporting that Iran is holding the Houthis off as a kind of ‘escape-plan’ for their regime. That if things go south, uprisings and ethnic insurgencies rise to emerging-state actor under the #3 scenario over months, then having a safe retreat into Yemen under Houthi strongholds sounds good on paper. I don’t know why, in such a scenario, the Houthis would take them.
Another reason may be that the US is successfully deterring, bribing, or otherwise holding the Houthis back. This could be some variation of outright cash, concessions that the US may reduce future operations, or a host of measures plausible or fanciful. The key is everyday the Houthis stay out, is a day further that the US and Israel can focus on Iran without the additive complexity of a southern front. That means the incentives they can offer the Houthis are quite high. And if in the off chance Iran appears to be winning, the Houthis can always choose then to break any agreement and pull the oldest of all strategies which is to side with the already-winning side.
Bottom line the Goodfellas scenario is, as of today, a very unlikely scenario. But that it’s even possible indicates how much the regional military and political landscape has shifted over just three weeks.
KEY THINGS TO WATCH
Just as I started telling people to start hitting “refresh” on Aljazeera Friday 27 FEB after the evacuation orders were issues by DoS; I’d suggest people who are concerned with this put “Houthi” on a google bar and periodically hit refresh.
For those more into the daily check in, I continue to suggest the Institute for the Study of War Daily Briefs.
If you don’t have that kind of time, or stomach for anxiety, simply watching the oil prices I mentioned will give an aggregate measure.
Sources in first comment. Also, I’ve finally started putting some of these posts back up on the InfoMullet. The entire analysis of the Iran War from 28 Feb to Friday is up, todays will be going up soon. After that I’m filling in the road to the Iran war with analysis from the 12-Day war last June through the snapback provisions activating, the December-January uprisings and updates on the movement of forces into position.
For those who wonder 3,825 words in 2hrs and 45minutes. Not counting the 30 minutes I spent dicking around looking for a Goodfellas screen shot I could modify.
Sources
Houthi Signaling
https://thedeepdive.ca/houthis-threaten-arab-interceptors/
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemen-s-houthi-leader-signals-military-readiness-amid-regional-escalation/3872828
Iraqi PMF attacks and US-PMF Ceasefire over Baghdad Embassy
US Ford’s Fire Incidents & General Effects of 11months on Deployment and 3 weeks at war
Attack on Nuclear Power Plants
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/21/iran-says-us-and-israel-attacked-natanz-nuclear-facility
March 21 Update at ISW – it’s a busy one
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-21-2026/
Oil Prices including spot markets I used to create the chart. Dubai is probably the benchmark for spot prices, but you can browse through Oman, Kuwait etc. for other spot prices. There’s a wide variation, with some prices going up to $150, and this more closely reflects the security and infrastructure damage for that particular country.
https://oilprice.com/oil-price-charts/
Houthi Drone and Missile Ranges overlapping
https://www.twz.com/news-features/drone-attacks-on-u-s-from-the-sea-are-a-known-possibility
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