01 Apr 2026
1 APR Update: Diplomacy is War by Other Means
TLDRUpFront: If war is politics by other means, then diplomacy is war by other means. A system model to understand the Trump (US) and Khamenei (Iran) diplomatic system structure that has a bit more nuance than “TACO v. B” or “performative rites of agitation.”
FullContextIntheBack:
Up to this point, I’ve mainly used systems analysis to study the JADO vs. Mosaic theater strategies employed in the war between the US and Iran. And I think those have been pretty on the mark. But we reach the 9 APR window, where I forecast that a face-saving ceasefire would follow; I think it’s worth adding some system structure to the diplomatic efforts.
A ‘drifting goals’ archetype in systems thinking is used to model leadership behaviors that we’re all familiar with in the business, government, or academic worlds. Leaders set high goals for their organizations, but when those organizations fail to meet them, rather than holding to the goals or fixing the root cause of the performance issue, the leader simply drops the goals. After all, a lower goal that is closer to actual performance is easier to meet.
The drifting part comes in that, over time, this becomes a reinforcing effect. Lowered goals *also* aren’t met as performance suffers amid mixed leadership signals and unclear objectives. Failure to meet even the reduced goals leads to *further* reduction of goals.
This can be a catastrophic outcome for organizations, but it can also help us understand where and how a ceasefire might be achieved between the US and Iran.
In the system paradigm, which I’m calling ‘Diplomacy is war by other means’ for now, both Trump and Khamenei are depicted in symmetrical drifting goals structures (left for the US and right for Iran) linked by a cease-fire window. The top half of each structure is the leadership, and the bottom half is the military forces they control.
Both start with maximalist goals (the upper-left for Trump and the upper-right for Khamenei) in the conflict. We could use the early statements by both as evidence: Trump wants the regime overthrown etc. But the gap between those maximalist goals and actual performance remains wide, even as their militaries carry out competent actions in support of those goals. (One of the reasons the gap is high is that it appears that competently executed JADO and Mosaic Warfare are far closer matches to one another than anything we’ve seen in LSCO for 30+ years.).
So the gap-to-goal function in both structures drives the leader to redefine what success means, dropping the goal to be closer to the actual and reducing the gap. This creates the reinforcing process described above. Between the two structures is a linking “chance of ceasefire” which increases as the gaps to goals decrease.
Although not fully depicted, I’ve also added linkages between this structure and the JADO vs. Mosaic Warfare competing theater strategy paradigm to create a larger endogenous system that encompasses both warfighting, which is politics by other means, and diplomacy, which is war by other means. But for clarity, I’ve only added inputs and outputs marked by <<…>>. The inputs are the pressures that each leader responds to. As regional infrastructure damages and casualties rise (increasing instability in global markets) the pressure on Trump to reduce his maximalist goals increases. As the Iranian regime perceives its risk of overthrow as reducing, Khamenei’s desire to maintain maximalist goals also reduces.
Ultimately, as the chance of a ceasefire increases, the system naturally decreases the ‘foot on the gas’ of militaries performing competent actions. For blue, this is shifting offensive OODA loop actions against Iran to defensive, and for red, this is reducing the barrage attacks and proxy attacks.
The behavior mode of this structure is depicted in the accompanying chart. The goals of both US and Iran begin in the upper left. This is the “maximalist zone” where the chance of a ceasefire is the lowest.
As the drifting goals section kicks in, the chance for a ceasefire increases. At some point, the ‘reduced definitions of success’ of both Iran and the US intersect in a window period with the chance of a ceasefire, which is the first window. As the chances go up, and the reduced goals continue to erode, the window of most likely ceasefire expands. (Note I’m still thinking no major ceasefire until after 9 APR, which will be the end of the 40-day mourning period for the former Supreme Leader and other major leaders killed on 28 FEB.) This is part of the ‘performative rites of agitation’ that are part of Iranian culture, discussed previously, in that face-saving symbolic actions may still continue even as the desire for peace gets higher.
Of course, there are limitations. System dynamics models systems, not individuals. So putting individuals into a model is fraught. Trump’s daily shifts between TACO and BURGER are well known. The former stands for ‘Trump Always Caves Overtime’ (TACO) while the latter stands for ‘Bombastic Unbelievable Rhetoric Generating Exaggerated Reality (BURGER). Likewise, Khamenei II might not be the actual decision-making authority, or he may be killed or removed. Likewise, Israeli, a spoiler, is not depicted in the model.
Still, as a general system structure of how we might get to a ceasefire in this war, and how most ceasefires are reached. As long as actors maintain their maximalist positions, the chances of a cease-fire are low. As their gap to goal erodes as part of drifting goals, the chances increase. In some ways, a ceasefire is just a redefinition of success that an actor had at the start of a war.
Also, it’s important to note a ceasefire does *not* mean a return to normal. The Islamic Republic of Iran has spent the last 20 years pursuing nuclear weapons in order to have regional influence and gain a chip that counters its rogue nation status. Sovereign control of the Strait of Hormuz IS that ‘chit’ which gives them the influence they need. They could abandon nuclear weapons development, instead opting for the (apparently) far easier and far more lucrative control of the Strait of Hormuz and use that to obtain a ceasefire which increases their strategic position relative to their start. It’s not hard to imagine a hypothetical “Board of Peace” established to control the Strait. Trump would be offered a seat, to placate his ego, and maybe even Saudi Arabia or the GCC as face-saving measures. But the bulk of the control (dejour or defacto) would be Iran with its established ability to shut the Straits down.
Iran wouldn’t *need* nuclear weapons at that point. The Strait is a far more powerful tool in creating both influence they’ve never had before, and an economic engine to help rebuild the country.
Personally, I’m not sure the US, or the rest of the world outside of China and Russia, can tolerate an Iranian-controlled Strait. But India and Pakistan are already getting close, and if enough other countries fall in line, it may become impossible to form a sufficiently large coalition to shoulder the burden and the cost of any one country to clear the Straits becomes too high.
In essence, what was an unthinkable outcome five weeks ago: Iran with recognized sovereign control of the Strait of Hormuz and its trade, becomes the drifting goal outcome on which a ceasefire is obtained and a new regional order arises.
Discussion
Q: Do you take into consideration the perceived (stated) vs factual (based on enounced intent) vs occulted goals (actual multiactor dynamic intent) when analyzing? I know this may lead to the pitfall of conspiracy vs ground truth discussion. But given the actors, stretch goals, and private agenda, tactical maneuvers can be overshadowed by the pr stunts and perceived leverage, as one side has more and many stakeholders and interests to manage than the other, and both are closer to unveiling the limits of their actual levers as time evolves. Kudos for the deep dive on a live complex localized system.
A: Yes to all three. The problem, purpose and audience of a model is going to drive the level of detail. But we’re trying to establish, within those boundaries, an operational causality that matches “how things actually work”, and what you describe is how it actually is.
So an exploratory model may aggregate those details to focus on high-level behaviors. But a calibrated model may depict structures for all three.
First is the “ground truth,” which is the actual state of things in a model. But though the “computer” knows the system’s state, no decision-maker ever truly does. So we use what are called Baker Rules: you have to build structures that answer what they knew, and when they knew it. The transmission of ground truth to the decision maker should, and ought to be, time-delayed, error-prone, and filtered to reflect real-world complexities. Multi-decision maker structures should reflect that a ground commander of the IRGC has better knowledge of the status of their battery than the Parliamentarian speaker, but that speaker may have more insights into diplomatic discussions. And the gaps and distances between those decision makers are important to model (if the problem is the pacing of barrages fired relative to diplomatic dialogue)
Adding to that, multi-actor decision-making is a competitive decision between two actors, such as in warfare or diplomacy. The information being reacted to is both internal intelligence and external signaling, and deciphering the position and signals being sent.
Which is why I forecast the barrages that occurred after Trump’s speech last night. If Iranian leaders see Trump signal untrue claims of “complete destruction,” they may realize they can gain an advantage because either his intelligence is bad, or his signaling is bad, and they can exploit that by demonstrating barrage capability.
A master-class historical example of this was the Tet Offensive. Which, operationally speaking, for North Vietnam was a disaster, costing huge resources they couldn’t afford to lose, and didn’t change the struggle and pressures they were under. But at the strategic level, it was a masterstroke because it undercut the signals of “military battlefield dominance” from the US administration, undermining domestic confidence in how the war was going.
Q: “I don’t think Iran has put forward maximalist goals.”
Of the five, there are currently two that stand out…(and this is ignoring any ‘death to Israel’, ‘death to America’ claims as being propaganda and somewhat beside the point, as all countries are now at war with each other.)
1. Sovereign control of the Straits of Hormuz violates UNCLOS as it’s classified an ‘international strait’ and like the Straits of Gibraltar (or others) the unrestricted right of free passage of maritime trade is paramount Iran is a signatory of UNCLOS, but never ratified it AFAIK. But the rest of the world did so there’s that. UNCLOS has 170+ signatories, which is only really exceeded in this conversation by the NPT (nuclear non-proliferation) with 191 signatories (see below). At that level of ratification, it’s as close as one can get to ‘current international order’. I can see them easing this into a shared control if it gets them a peace, something that I’ve mentioned that looks like the Board of Peace with Trump and GCC on it, but defacto/dejour control favoring Iran. Which is less than “sovereign” but still acceptable, e.g. not maximalist any longer.
2. Reparations – yah that’s a nonstarter, and you’ll see it drop as we get closer to the ceasefire window.
Q: “Why does this (reduced perception of risk leading to erosion of maximalist goals) logically follow? Seems like would only strengthen his base with a rally around the flag effect.”
Loss of regime is an existential risk for the regime, and while that’s a realistic threat, signaling compromise serves no purpose and can actually weaken their position. We say the “regime,” but really it’s a few hundred families and their associated members holding insider positions, and if there are realistic chances the regime will fall or be substantively changed, all of them are at risk, and cracks emerge as they begin to position against one another for their own benefit. Mind you, I don’t think we’re at a realistic threat to the regime right now, but that may change in the next few weeks/months based on actions. (So I think we’ve already moved down the drifting goals here.)
The rally-around-the-flag effect triggers different mechanisms that, indirectly, reduce perceived risk, so consider it subsumed.
Q: “I’ve seen no published evidence that Iran was pursuing anything other than nuclear power for electrical production, which is its right.”
Since June of 2025 or at any time ever? If the former, that’s a valid argument. But if the latter I suspect you may be mistaking “pre-breakout development” with actual “nuclear weapons.” And it can be confusing. I find this analogy helpful. Consider someone with all the pieces of a pistol lying in front of them on a table disassembled. Do they have a pistol? Well, not until they assemble it. But how fast can they assemble it?
This is the breakout period. So Iran claimed “not to be pursuing nuclear weapons” while building capabilities to put all the pistol pieces on the table, and just not assemble them. General consensus pre-12 Day War is that their “break out period” had been between one week to one year for several years now.
If you are stating you’ve never seen any evidence anywhere, ever, that they ever were pursuing towards that pre-breakout capability in the last decade or two, I’d question how hard you were looking.
And given how smart and capable Iranian engineers and scientists are, and how technology can accelerate even when you’re looking closely, that uncertainty of “how long would breakout take” is a real strategic question, considering activating IAEA regimes and inspections can take months.
Q: These administrations should be shipped off to the Hague…Hasn’t Ukraine and North Korean demonstrated that all nations have ‘sovereign rights’ to pursue nuclear weapons?
It’s an interesting point you make about the Hague International Criminal Court, nuclear weapons, and sovereign rights. IYou claim that Ukraine and North Korea have “sovereign rights” to pursue nuclear weapons, and by extension, Iran can too. However, the NPT has 191 signatories, so the world’s consensus position, by treaty, is no. It’s not a sovereign right. And the Hague, which you assert has a legitimate authority to conduct international criminal courts, only had ~120 or so signatories?
So, under this construction, which has more international authority:
The Hague at ~120 signatories
UNCLOS at ~170
or NPT at ~190
One could argue “all of the above” which is fine. But to say you believe in the Hague but not NPT would require some justification I think.
And that’s why states which continue to pursue nuclear weapons are often declared rogue states while in the act of pursuit, but recognized as “nuclear club” after they get it…if they play by most of the other international order rules.
Sovereignty, and diplomacy between nations, gets tricksy it turns out.
Sources
Original FB Post on 1 APR 2026
Performative Rites of Agitation in the Aftermath of Soleimani’s Assassination
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